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Artificial Intelligence (AI) has emerged as a game-changer across many industries, revolutionising the way we conduct our lives, and the drone industry is certainly seen as an early adopter of AI technology enhancements.

The integration of AI technology within commercial drones has unlocked unparalleled possibilities across multiple industry sectors including agriculture, surveillance & security, and logistics as well as search & rescue operations. AI has truly empowered drones with an ability to operate with enhanced autonomy and intelligence within complex environments. The weaponisation of AI empowered drones is also now firmly established as a military capability and we need look no further than Ukraine to see credible and indeed deadly examples of this technology in use.

So, an important question is, what are the most effective countermeasure options? How do we stop a hostile AI enabled drone attack in, say, city centres??

 

 

Well, thank goodness for jamming technology, right?

In truth, jamming by itself is quickly becoming less effective as a drone mitigation capability, and I’ll explain why. Jamming is the intentional transmission of powerful RF signals that cause interference with communication signals and disrupt the control link in some way between, in this case, the drone and its pilot. The rapid pace of drone AI technology development, however, could enable AI drones to possibly circumvent the effect of RF jamming signals.

To defend against the effects of jamming, modern drone software could possibly include AI algorithms that analyse, interpret, and categorise incoming signals, allowing them to detect the presence of jamming signals and take evasive action. AI-enabled drones could thereby adapt to
these changing environments and dynamically adjust.

AI enhanced drones could achieve this through advanced signal analysis capabilities enabling them to differentiate between normal communication and jamming signals. By analysing the frequency, power and patterns of incoming signals, AI algorithms could classify and identify jamming attempts with ever increasing accuracy. This classification would allow the drone to respond dynamically and autonomously change their flight path to bypass or even fly though RF jamming interference. What could this mean for the future of C-UAS?

By leveraging AI algorithms for signal analysis and dynamic route planning, drones can effectively detect, avoid, or fly through jamming signals. This ensures their uninterrupted operation on route to mission success, be that hostile or otherwise.

This represents an emerging threat, and the mitigation pendulum has already swung away from more traditional technologies. There are already reports of AI-enabled drones attempting to outmanoeuvre law enforcement agencies’ direct RF jamming operations, and we can only expect AI technology to grow exponentially in this area. RF jamming could rapidly become subordinate to modern mitigation technology capable of staying ahead of rapidly evolving software driven technology, such as AI.

It’s time to rapidly reevaluate effective drone mitigation tools within the C-UAS toolbox and in Part 2 of this blog we’ll do just that: What is the role of software-based cyber mitigation solutions capable of taking full control of even the most sophisticated AI enhanced drones?

In a series of recent blog posts focused on airport drone mitigation, Mark Rutherford, our Sales Director in the UK, explained what is jamming, its drone frequencies, different types of jammers, effectiveness and consequences. While jamming has some benefits, it can also bring some negative impact, depending on the environment and/or scenario. This is particularly true in urban and sensitive environments and, as Mark points out, it can affect airport operations by grounding and/or diverting all aircrafts, until the situation is under control.

GPS jamming has caused operational interference in the Middle East. In fact, a recent article highlights how jamming of satellite-based navigation systems – including UAVs – just reached a six-month-peak, interfering with the operations of planes in the area. While GPS jamming may be used to protect the region from hostile UAVs, it can also affect the airspace. In fact, as pointed out in the article, in the past weekend, more than 20% of planes flying in the area reported significant GPS jamming – which led to airplanes being diverted.

In 2022, there were dozens of airport drone incidents around the world. Some of them led to diverted flights, disrupted takeoffs and landings, and airports closures. Airports continue to experience these incidents in 2023 (the Dublin Airport suspended flights six times since January 2023 due to drone sightings!). While jammers can stop drones, it could be a costly countermeasure, particularly if planes are grounded, leading to heavy financial losses to airlines and airports. In addition, a jammer doesn’t take control of the drone or the pilot, but rather impacts the drone pilot and GPS signals. This can lead to an unexpected outcome that may damage infrastructure, aircrafts and vehicles, or harm people in the area.

There is a wide range of counter-drone (C-UAS) detection and mitigation technologies available today. Different anti-drone technologies vary in their suitability for each use case and scenario. As jammers can lead to unintended consequences in certain environments, traditional and modern technologies should be examined to inform evaluations and decision making, in the context of the specific needs of the sector, environment, and use case.

To evaluate and compare C-UAS mitigation (and mitigation) technologies, it’s important to review and analyze the detailed features and functions of each anti-drone device, including  functionality, strengths, and challenges, and operational considerations. A suitable counter-drone technology for detection and mitigation must address the specific needs of the use case and environment.

Why Study Jammers?

As a reminder of why we’re looking at jamming in this series of blogs, it’s clear that many airports either have no C-UAS or believe they have one, when in reality what they really have is merely a drone ‘detection’ system, which does not ‘counter’ the drone at all. Traditionally, there have been 3 broadly defined ‘conventional’ solutions when it came to countering rogue drones: kill, capture, or jam. Kinetic “kill or soft capture” solutions are not an option, given the threat of collateral damage and the cessation in airport and airline operations until the cat-and-mouse game is over. This left just one traditional solution – jamming. But is jamming a viable solution for airports?

In previous blogs in this series, we’ve looked at what jamming is, how jammers operate, the consequences of jamming all four frequencies, the types of jammers available, how effective they are at airports and how a rogue drone will respond when a jammer is used against it. As I pointed out in my last blog (When a Drone is Jammed…) , authorised airport security and police must decide if jamming is the right solution for them and whether they should purchase a jamming system, or look at a new generation of emerging technologies to mitigate the threat from a rogue drone.

Which Leads us to Five Key Questions…

There are many questions airport security and aviation police should ask when considering if jamming is a viable solution for an airport. To summarise what we’ve talked about in this series of blogs, I’ve answered what I deem to be the five ‘key questions’:

Q1. Which jamming technique is best?

For jamming to be truly effective, it is necessary to employ noise jamming, with three possible techniques: spot, sweep and barrage. Spot jamming can’t deal with drones which are frequency agile, as it focusses on a single frequency. Sweeping jamming only focusses the energy on one frequency at a time, so is unable to follow the pattern of a frequency agile drone. Barrage jamming is less powerful on each frequency, decreasing its effective range, but it does target all four frequencies used by drones and therefore is the most effective at jamming most drones.

Q2. That’s great! So, is jamming all four frequencies an option?

Jamming all four frequencies (or even only one frequency) will likely have a detrimental effect on aircraft and airport operations while the jammer is being used. It may also lead to major collateral effects on businesses and homes around the airport. Jamming all 4 frequencies is an option, but it will probably result in grounding all aircraft and diverting flights. The airport must bear in mind the cost to airports and airlines for suspending operations – not to mention the negative publicity from such an incident!

Q3. Understanding the risk, what type of jammer is best suited to an airport?

Each type of jammer – omnidirectional, directional or targeting – will have a different impact on airport operations, aircraft, local businesses and communities. Omnidirectional jammers don’t need cueing onto the drone, but they jam everything in a 360° arc, causing the most disruption to an airport. Directional jammers do need cueing onto the drone, but limit the disruption as they only jam in one direction. Both are generally expensive because of the number of jammers needed, the raw power required and the cost of additional sensors to cue the jammers. Targeting jammers are best suited for airports as they cause the least amount of disruption, they’re simple to use – point and shoot – and relatively cheap.

Q4. Okay, so targeting jammers are the best option?

Of all the jamming solutions, yes, this seems to be the least problematic. However, the jammer operator must have direct and unobstructed line of sight with the drone, which is difficult on an airfield with slab sided hangers, terminals, and control towers. Passengers and public will see what looks like a gun being pointed into the air as the jammer operator attempts to get a shot at a fast-moving drone – alarming and likely to attract unwanted attention. Targeting jammers have limited range on a sprawling airfield and don’t protect the air corridors leading to and from the airport where an aircraft is most vulnerable. So, yes, targeting jammers are an option, but using them will still result in the grounding of all aircraft and diverting flights until the potentially lengthy chase is brought to an end.

Q5. If targeting jammers are the best option, what risks are associated with how drones respond to them?

No matter which jamming technique or type of jammer is used and no matter what model of drone is targeted – including commercial, DIY and hacked drones – if the jamming is effective the impact on the drone is the same: the drone pilot’s signals and/or the GPS signal are drowned out. Targeting jammers can be effective against drones but they do not take control of the drone or the pilot. When jammed, the drone will attempt to respond in the way it has been programmed, but in reality, that outcome is unpredictable and completely out of the control of the jammer operator; they can only watch and report on the drone’s response. It may fly back to the take-off point safely, it may fly partway home and land in an unknown location or crash, it may attempt to return home by the most direct route across runways, or fly into infrastructure. The drone may have been programmed to land in the middle of the runway or fly into a terminal, aircraft apron or ATC tower, it may immediately descend and land on whatever is directly under it, it may hover for as long as the battery will last then land or crash, it may have been programmed to fly away and return from another direction, or it may become immediately unstable and crash. If the GPS jamming is effective, it may fly off in an unpredictable direction across runways, until it crashes or lands in an unknown location. Finally, if the drone is functioning correctly, it will eventually move out of the effective jammer range and control, will revert back to the drone pilot, who will be able to continue harassing or attacking the airport.

The Verdict

Having spent over 40 years operating in a security environment and being responsible for operating against (for real and by Red Teaming[1]) and protecting airport facilities, including providing security consultancy to some of the most prestigious locations one could imagine, and with a deep level of technical knowledge and understanding of drones, drone detection systems, drone mitigation systems like jammers, and human behaviour, I’ve come to the following conclusion… In the absence of any other C-UAS technology, I could not justify the use of a kinetic or capture solution and that would leave me with no option other than to use a jamming solution. Of all the types of jamming and jammers, I’d probably choose a hand-held targeting jammer, but I’d still have to stop airport operations by grounding and diverting all aircraft until the situation was under control.

I’d advise owners and directors of airports and airlines, as well as airport operational and security professionals, that there are 2 main issues they must be prepared for as a result of choosing a jammer as a solution:

  • Financial and Reputational Impact: You can’t prevent a drone from approaching and getting onto the airfield or into controlled airspace. You can’t predict how long it will take to get a rogue drone event under control. You cannot guarantee that the event won’t happen again, whether immediately or in the near future. Therefore, you must be prepared for the risk of heavy financial losses when a drone stops the operation, and the associated reputational damage that comes with delayed and cancelled flights.
  • Risk and Liability Impact: You can’t influence or predict how a rogue drone will respond to jamming. There is a real risk the drone will crash uncontrollably, fly into an aircraft in mid-air, fly into a building inside or outside the airfield perimeter or land in a place that would prolong the operation restarting. Therefore, one must understand the risks and the liabilities which comes should a jammed drone cause damage to infrastructure, aircraft or vehicles or harm aircrew, passengers, staff or the public.

I’d conclude that that a hand-held jammer is the best ‘conventional’ rogue drone mitigation solution, but all things considered, it is not a truly viable solution as it comes with huge drawbacks and the risks are unacceptably high. Therefore, we must continue to scour the horizon for a viable solution from emerging technologies.

New Generation of C-UAS

In my next blog we’ll look at emerging technologies for the next generation of C-UAS in a search for one which takes full control of the rogue drone before it reaches the airport or controlled airspace, so airport and airline operations can continue to function unhindered …

[1] Red Teaming – Using terrorist and criminal techniques to conduct simulated attacks using real weapons and equipment, in real time when the operation is fully functioning, to holistically assess security plans, policies, protocols, systems, equipment and personnel, in which to advise and make recommendations for change.

In the previous post – Drone Jamming Effectiveness at Airports – we discussed the effectiveness, features, and limitations of jammers. Specifically, we looked at what happens to a drone when it’s jammed, and how that can affect airport activities.

Let’s go a bit further to understand what a drone recovery program is and its fundamental issues. What a drone will do when it’s jammed depends on who programmed it, and how it was done.

Deaf and Blind

When a drone is effectively jammed, the drone pilot’s signal commands and/or the GPS signal cannot be received and understood by the drone because of the intense noise interference created by the RF jammer – it’s blocked out. Essentially, the drone is now flying ‘deaf’ because the communications link between the drone pilot’s transmitter and the drone’s receiver has been temporarily severed, or the drone is flying ‘blind’ because the GPS signal is not received as it is blocked out.

Commercial Drones

For most commercial drones, when it loses communication with the pilot, the drone is pre-programmed by the manufacturer to immediately enter hover mode, so it doesn’t hit anything. It will then climb vertically to a safe altitude so it’s clear of any obstacles, then execute a return to home – either where it originally took off from or an updated home location. Some drones will simply land where they are if the programming deems it to be safer to do so (for example, if GPS isn’t available to them and navigation can’t be trusted). If the drone is low on battery power and is unable to make it to the home location, or the return track is deemed too risky, it is usually programmed to go into hover mode and land, or begin its journey home before descending vertically with only sufficient battery power to complete a controlled ‘soft’ landing. All this is without any input from the pilot.

Among the different manufacturers and different models, there are variations of this programmed flight, but it’s essentially a program to return the drone, or to keep the drone safe.

DIY Drones and Hacked Commercial Drones

Most DIY drone enthusiasts will also want to keep their drone safe from harm and be able to return them  home, so the process above is likely to be the same. They may have a more complex program, with multiple safe landing points along a route, especially when working near the edge of the flight endurance envelope. However, a sinister pilot who may want to hit a planned target like a crowd, building or aircraft on the ground, or has attached an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) or chemical aerosol spray to the drone, could reprogram their commercial or DIY drone with a ‘home location’ which is exactly the same location as the ‘target location’!

Crash, Bang, Wallop

Even if you can positively identify the exact make and model of the drone, it’s still not possible to know exactly what it will do when it’s jammed due to many factors:

  • Firmware and Software – The firmware and software in the drone are constantly being updated and with it, the program it follows when it loses connectivity with the pilot. As we highlighted before, when jammed, it might land immediately, it might attempt to return home on a reverse route, it might return taking the shortest route to home (which might be straight across a runway, flight path, crowd or into a building, such as an air traffic control tower), or it might return as close to home as possible and land.
  • Hacked Drones – The programmer may follow one of the safer programs as referred to above, but may also have programmed the drone with sinister intent. When jammed, it may be programmed to fly directly into a target, or to hover for as long as the battery lasts before crashing. It could perhaps land in a location which causes an obstruction or even mimic that it’s landed and been defeated, before taking off again. It may be programmed to fly a set flight pattern for maximum annoyance so it’s difficult to jam. It might even be programmed to fly away from the airfield to avoid jamming before returning from a different direction each time. The possibilities are as endless as the creativity of the person who programs the drone.
  • Unpredictability and Instability – Drones do not always behave as they’re programmed when that amount of energy is fired at them from an RF jammer. Many drones can become unpredictable or unstable and when this occurs things can get out of control very quickly. The drone may lose control and crash where it is or somewhere else in the near vicinity. It may hover until the power fails and crash. The drone may become completely disorientated and attempt to return home, but instead fly a different fight profile crashing elsewhere.

Stop, Stop, Stop ….

When a drone responds to jamming in a way that the operator doesn’t expect, there is little that the jammer operator can do, other than to stop jamming. Having spoken to many jammer operators, I understand that they expect one of these four things to happen:

  • the drone will respond unpredictably, resulting in a crash or further issues.
  • the drone descends and lands.
  • the drone executes its recovery program.
  • the drone moves out of jammer range and control reverts back to the drone pilot, who may continue with the initial intent.

Given all the issues regarding jamming operations near airports, airport security and police must decide if jamming is the right solution for them, and whether they should purchase a jamming system or look at alternatives to mitigate the threat from a rogue drone.

In my next blog post, we will look at key questions on whether Jamming is a Viable Solution for Airports. 

Not a simple issue.

As discussed in my previous post (Types of Jammers), each type of jammer brings drawbacks and limitations to airport operations.

Let’s dive into these issues:

Power Struggle

When it comes to jamming, the most crucial factor is power. Quite simply, if the signal from the pilot and the GPS is strong enough so that the drone can demodulate and decode them despite the noise from the jammer, jamming will be ineffective. Any fixed omnidirectional and directional jammer will presumably be positioned on the airfield, and the rogue drone pilot will likely be outside the airfield boundary. If the drone is flown within the airfield perimeter, the signal strength from the pilot will degrade with increasing distance and conversely, the effect of the jamming signal on the drone will increase as the drone gets closer. As such, in theory, how well jamming will work depends on the location of the jammer with the real estate of the covered area, assuming a clear line of sight. But as we’ve discussed, any equipment operating on those four relevant frequencies will suffer interference.

Real Estate 

Airports can be sprawling with large and often oddly shaped boundaries. Therefore, when using fixed jammers (omnidirectional and directional), you may need multiple jammers to cover the airport’s real estate. (This is true of all solutions, as they have a specific range, but some are more effective as they can use other means. Most airports – particularly large ones – may need more than one system to cover the protected area properly.)

Another option is to use targeting jammers to complement fixed jammers and cover dead spots, or, alternatively, have them as the only jamming option and employ a qualified and authorized security or police quick reaction force (QRF). This poses problems due to the configuration of an airport with its runways, taxiways, aprons, peritracks and access roads. Given the power required to successfully jam a drone, combined with the sheer size of the airport, it’s likely that the security/police QRF will have to crisscross the airport as they attempt to get into position to fire the jammer. What complicates this is that the drone flightpath will be unpredictable, and therefore the jammer operator will have to point and shoot at the drone (once they get close enough), regardless of the angle. Handheld targeting jammers are not like lasers with a pinpoint beam. They emit a cone of RF energy, which can range from approximately 40° to 90°, and will affect other equipment within that cone. An airport will generally not be able to keep operations running when a human with a jammer gun is pointing high-power RF energy wherever needed to mitigate the threat.

Flightpaths

One aspect which is often overlooked is the approach and departure flightpaths to and from an airport. Some reports indicate there are more Airprox Reports submitted by pilots for near misses with drones than there are drone breaches of the airport boundary. Given that commercial aircraft fly at heights and speeds where rogue drones are ineffective, many near misses would occur at the most dangerous point of an aircraft’s entire flight profile, the take-off and climb and the approach to land. While airport security staff may determine they are only responsible for what is inside the airport boundary, the reality is that air traffic control is responsible for the approach flightpath, the departure flight path, and the airspace leading to and from them. However, the nefarious or careless drone pilot may actually be inclined to position a drone directly underneath or just to one side of the flightpath, to take a picture, video, or worse, a hostile interception, and that could be many kilometers from the airport boundary. When an airport is allowed to use a directional jammer, it may jam communications and other operations in a public area with businesses and homes underneath the flightpath. A better and safer option would be to deploy a police QRF with a targeting jammer. However, the coordination and logistics of negotiating streets, private land and the public while attempting to track a drone and get into position to stop it, make this tougher than it is on an airfield.

Control

Jamming does not take over control of the drone. It merely negates the control of the pilot. A drone that loses its remote controller’s signal will generally commence an “emergency back-up plan,” which in most cases will be either returning home, hovering in place, or landing on the spot. In amateur drones, it may be programmed to do other types of actions. Either way, if the pilot loses control, and the jammer does not control the drone, the result is a drone that is controlled by nobody, which acts the way it was programmed to do (and not known by the jammer operator) and may pose a risk to air traffic or ground operations. In this situation, even if the pilot did not mean to cause any damage, and was going to withdraw from the protected area, it is out of control.

As we highlighted in the previous blog post, as effective as jammers can be, their operations are not so simple and straightforward at airports, particularly busy ones.

So, what happens When a Drone is Jammed? We’ll investigate it in my next blog.

In my last post – The Issues with Jamming Drone Frequencies – we started to dig into why jammers may not be the ideal solution to protect airports from rogue drone activity, particularly as jamming the frequencies used by drones could have a detrimental effect on airport operations and nearby businesses and residences.

In this blog, let’s look at the different types of jammers available today and how effective they are.

A Series of Jammers

Radio Frequency (RF) jammers come in many guises and vary from large military-grade multi-sensor jamming systems (costing tens of millions of pounds or dollars) to small, handheld, point-and-shoot jamming guns (costing a few thousand). The characteristics of each vary hugely but, to put into context how they operate, they’re either omnidirectional, directional, or targeted RF energy transmitters:

  • Omnidirectional RF jamming transmitters provide 360o protection around their position, jamming any drones which fly within their effective radial range.
  • Directional RF jamming transmitters focus in one direction to provide between 60o (or sometimes even less) and 120o of protection, jamming any drones which fly within their effective directional range. These can be fixed to protect known or suspected avenues of approach, or they can be slaved to a radar or optical drone detection system and directed toward the potential drone.
  • Targeted RF jamming transmits a much tighter cone of jamming energy, and these are usually found in jamming guns where the operator specifically points the gun to what they believe or know to be a drone, jamming it. It’s important to note that these guns have very limited range (usually an effective range of only a few hundred meters), and a drone can fly at a high enough altitude to avoid such a countermeasure.

As highlighted above, each jammer has its own merits and drawbacks. Now we’ll evaluate just how effective jammers are on drones.

There are four main drawbacks to these jammers:

  1. To have any effect at all, a jammer must have direct and unobstructed line of sight with the drone. This is difficult on an airfield with slab sided hangers, terminals, and control towers, – even more so in built-up urban residential and industrial areas, and compounded over longer distances with a greater number of obstacles.
  2. If we employ the targeted jammer option, a complex cat-and-mouse chase occurs, taking time and labour. This chase is very visible and noticeable to passengers and the public, potentially causing panic and distraction as a jammer gun looks like err, a gun!
  3. Airports may possibly need to turn off any systems that may be affected, grounding and stopping all aircraft from moving before jamming commences, and then keeping aircraft grounded and stationary until the threat subsides. Operating the jammer on a lower power to prevent such interruption to the airfield and aircraft operation could notably limit its range, making it ineffective in many risky scenarios.
  4. Once disconnected from the drone operator, the drone could fly out of control, or fly a pre-programmed flight path. It could fly into the take-off or landing path, possibly hitting aircraft or facilities, or crash or force-land, potentially causing damage to property or injury to the public.

In essence, RF jammers can be effective, and may be suitable for a remote location with plenty of land surrounding the facility and nothing to damage. But for a busy airport, it’s not so simple. They could possibly work if they’re positioned well and there’s a well-trained and responsive QRF. However, the impact to airport operations could last for hours or days, and that’s unpalatable to an airport with time-critical airline schedules.

In the next blog post – Drone Jamming Effectiveness at Airports – we will go deeper into jammer drawbacks.

In my previous blog post– What is Jamming and How does it Work?, we reviewed “Jamming 101” topics – what are jammers, and how they operate. In this blog post, we will look at the frequency bands that drones operate on, and how jammers deal with them.

Frequency Bands

Commercial drones operate on four frequency bands: 2.4GHz, 5.8GHz, 433MHz and 915MHz.

Most of the more expensive commercial drones operate on 2.4GHz and 5.8GHz and use GPS L1, enabling the pilot to fly the fixed wing or quadcopter up to approximately 5km away, with some as far as 12km. Some of them automatically frequency hop between these bands or allow the pilot to configure it, and some can use one of these bands for flying and the other to send imagery back to the pilot. Amateur-built drones tend to use 433MHz or 915MHz, which may considerably extend their range, but will limit the rate and quality of the video feed from the drone, and at times will reduce the quality of communication with the drone.

The issue with jamming these four frequencies is that they’re not dedicated for use by drones only. These frequencies are also used by hobbyists for controlling models like cars, boats, aircraft, etc., and each frequency also plays a vital role in maintaining normal operations:

  • 433MHz is used by amateur radio operators and is also the wireless standard for home and workplace control and automation, which includes remote controls, vehicle keyless entry devices, door, gate and garage openers, window and door contact sensors, motion sensors, temperature sensors, water leak sensors, wall sockets, watering systems, home weather stations, headphones, baby monitors, etc. The list is endless.
  • 915MHz is used by walkie-talkies and amateur radio operators, and as a radar frequency for aviation and maritime. While its wireless networking is being phased out, it’s essential for long-range wireless access networks where it transmits information from gas, water, and electricity meters.
  • 2.4GHz is used in some radar systems, as well as in CCTV. It is the major operating band for the IEEE 802.11 standard for wireless data networks which serve Wi-Fi hotspots and communication, used by Bluetooth devices, IEEE 802.15.4-based wireless data networks, wireless peripherals like keyboards and mice, microphones, and speakers. It’s used for car alarms, video imagery senders, smart power meters, wireless power transmission, cordless telephones, microwave ovens. Like 433MHz, it’s also used for baby monitors, amateur radio operators, door, gate, and garage openers. Again, the list is endless.
  • 5.8GHz is used for weather, military, and amateur-satellite radars. It’s also a major operating band for the IEEE 802.11. standard for wireless data networks used by Wi-Fi communication, point-to-multipoint equipment for wireless internet service provider (WISP) solutions, broadband internet access, and IP video surveillance, network access points, wireless LAN applications and networks, WiMAX networks, wireless audio, and video systems.

While the above list is not exhaustive, it’s enough to establish that jamming any of these four frequencies could have a detrimental effect on an airport’s operations, as well as possibly a major collateral effect on the businesses and homes which surround an airport. But if you must use a jammer because nothing else is available, you must select a type capable of jamming drones using all four frequencies.

Not easy …

In my next blog – Types of Jammers – we’ll go a bit further on the different types available today.

In my previous blog – Why Mitigating the Increase in Rogue Drone Activity in the Vicinity of Airports Has Been Such a Hard Nut to Crack – Until Now? – we looked at the proliferation of drones and why they’re fast becoming a real nuisance to airports and air travel. Using the “VULNERABILITY x THREAT = RISK” model, we were able to establish that drones were not only a ‘Security’ risk, but also a major ‘Flight Safety’ risk too. While we know they pose a credible THREAT to airports and aircrafts in flight, the RISK is real, due to VULNERABILITY. Until the advent of new generation C-UAS technologies such as RF cyber-takeover as represented in D-Fend’s EnforceAir, the only options available to airports were jammers or other effectors, which capture or kill the drone. These were dismissed as unsuitable for airports due to several factors, which I’ll present to you in a new series of airport-related blog posts.

In this first piece, we’ll start with jammers, a security equipment claimed to be effective against drones. In the upcoming posts, we’ll dig a little deeper and look under the bonnet (hood!), before analysing and comparing them to an effective cyber-C-UAS solution.

Update on ‘Near Misses’ with Drones in Controlled Airspace

In my last blog, I made a statement that drone incidents in controlled airspace were on the increase. I don’t have a crystal ball, but the data we looked at indicated they would continue to persist. But did they?

The short answer? Yes.

As we posted in the D-Fend Solutions’ Drone Incident Tracker,  there were more than 70 additional incidents reported in the public domain since my last blog (many of those in the airport space)  of which more than 20 were extremely serious. In one, a Delta Airlines pilot reported that a drone narrowly missed the windshield by 8 feet at the Orlando International Airport!

So, what is Jamming?

‘Interference’ is the unintended disruption of wireless communications, whereas ‘jamming’ describes the deliberate act of interfering with the purpose of blocking communications. In lay terms, it means directing a very strong signal at a drone, blocking out the drone pilot’s signal commands so they can no longer control it and/or the GPS signal. Technically speaking, it’s much more complex than that and, to understand why it’s not suited to airports, we need to know how jamming and jammers operate.

How Do Jammers Operate?

There are two types of jamming: repeater jamming and noise jamming. The most common form of repeater jamming is digital frequency radio memory (DFRM). However, I’ll not cover it in this blog as it’s not applicable to drones, unlike noise jamming which is used against drones.

When it comes to drones, noise jamming is the main type of jamming. It involves three main techniques:

  • Spot Jamming – The jammer transmits all its radio frequency (RF) power on a single frequency – the one the drone is on. The issue with spot jamming is that it can’t deal with drones which are frequency agile as they use more than one frequency.
  • Sweep Jamming – The jammer shifts all its power from one frequency to another, sweeping up and down multiple frequencies in quick succession – although not all at the same time. Sweep jamming these multiple frequencies may result in , as the jamming could affect airport systems, which may malfunction or have to be switched off to protect them from the jammer’s high-power transmission.
  • Barrage Jamming – The jamming of multiple frequencies all at the same time using a single jammer. As we saw with sweep jamming, pumping out RF power to multiple frequencies may have an impact on airport operations. Not only that: with barrage jamming we have a power problem – the jammer spreads its power across multiple frequencies, making it less powerful on any one single frequency and decreasing its effective range.

As you can see, pumping out massive amounts of energy may have an adverse effect on airport systems…

In the next blog post – The Issues with Jamming Drone Frequencies – we’ll look at the problems with jamming frequencies and its effects.

I love the song “Jamming” by Bob Marley and the Wailers. It instantly relaxes me and puts a smile on my face, and gets me thinking about a traditional counter-small, unmanned aerial system (C-sUAS) approach:

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Jamming-based solutions, or hybrid solutions featuring jammers for mitigation, emit large amounts of energy to block drones’ controller signals. Looking at a specific sector, such as critical facilities and infrastructure, shows why jamming is not the ideal core for a comprehensive counter-drone strategy.

Jammers can interfere with radio communications, which could hamper communications in the vicinity during an intrusion, such as a potentially hostile rogue drone rapidly approaching a power plant. Think such an intrusion is a far-fetched scenario?

Two different drone swarms invaded the Palo Verde nuclear power plant in September 2019, according to David Hambling, a Forbes contributor: “Security forces watched, but were apparently helpless to act as the drones carried out their incursions before disappearing into the night.”

Jamming solutions do not provide full control, as drone operators can regain access to the drone once the jamming ceases. This means that a critical facilities security team member could temporarily disconnect a hostile drone from its remote control, only to watch the operator regain access to that threatening drone the second the jamming ceased!

Also, drones that get jammed can behave unpredictably, sometimes plummeting to the ground, which could endanger the facility’s employees or machinery.

To be clear, jamming can be a nice complement to radio frequency (RF)-based takeover technology as part of a multi-layered, holistic defense.

During a high-stress situation, a critical facilities security team needs a dependable counter-drone solution that will not only quickly neutralize the threat, but also preserve their operational continuity and communications. Takeover technology will offer critical facilities personnel, as well as organizations in other sectors, peace of mind:

Don’t worry about a thing,
‘Cause every little thing gonna be all right.

– Bob Marley, Three Little Birds

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